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Abstract
We study the performance of two-sided matching clearinghouses in the labo-
ratory. Our experimental design mimics the Gale-Shapley (1962) mechanism,
utilized to match hospitals and interns, schools and pupils, etc., with an array
of preference profiles. Several insights come out of our analysis. First, only
48% of the observed match outcomes are fully stable. Furthermore, among
those markets ending at a stable outcome, a large majority culminates in the
best stable matching for the receiving-side. Second, contrary to the theory,
participants on the receiving-side of the algorithm rarely truncate their true
preferences. In fact, it is the proposers who do not make offers in order of
their preference, frequently skipping potential partners. Third, market char-
acteristics affect behavior and outcomes: both the cardinal representation
and the span of the core influence whether outcomes are stable or close to
stable, as well as the number of turns it takes markets to converge to the
final outcome.
1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
Many two-sided matching markets function through centralized clearing-
houses: medical residents to hospitals, rabbis to congregations, high-school
students to schools, commissioned officers to military posts, college students
to dorms, etc. All use highly structured procedures to generate matches.
Clearinghouses have the advantage that they can be designed to implement
desirable outcomes at the market level. In particular, many of the extant
clearinghouses aim at implementing stable outcomes.1 In this paper we in-
spect such clearinghouses using laboratory experiments. Our goal is to gain
insights into when, in fact, stable outcomes emerge, as well as on how market
participants respond to incentives within such markets.
Consider the example of the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP)
in the United States, which has been operating since 1952. In 2009, a to-
tal of 36,000 physicians and 4,300 hospitals (herein referred to as workers
and firms, respectively) participated in the process, each submitting their
preference lists to the central clearinghouse. In the NRMP, each physician
submits preferences over hospitals’ job openings, and each hospital submits
their preferences for the physicians applying for each opening. Matches are
then computed by following a version of the DA algorithm(first described
in Gale and Shapley 1962). Namely, the clearinghouse emulates a process
through which workers make employment offers in order of their submitted
preferences, and firms, at each stage, hold on to the best offers they have
received for each vacancy, as determined by their submitted preferences. At
some point, all workers have an offer held or find themselves in a situation
where all the firms they would consider working for have rejected them. At
1Stable matchings are characterized by two conditions: i) no agent prefers to remain
by themselves over their allocated match; and ii) no two agents prefer to match to one
another over their allotted partners.
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this terminating point, currently held offers are converted to matches, and
the market’s outcome is determined.
This type of clearinghouse has appealing theoretical properties. When-
ever all market participants submit their preferences truthfully, the generated
matching is stable, with every resulting match being the most-preferred stable
partner for the proposing side. In terms of incentives, workers (the proposing
side) have no motive to misrepresent their preferences—it is a weakly dom-
inant strategy for each to reveal their true preferences. However, firms (the
side that receives proposals) have an incentive to submit “truncated” pref-
erences; that is, list the workers in the true order of preference, but shorten
their lists, declaring some of the workers unacceptable. In fact, firms are able
to obtain their most preferred stable matching by each truncating workers
ranked below their most-preferred stable partner.2
In order to determine outcomes and responses to incentives under such
clearinghouses, field data can be very useful, but have inherent drawbacks:
true preferences are not observed, interactions between participants outside
of the clearinghouse are difficult to gauge, and the information subjects have
regarding others’ preferences is unclear. This is why experiments, which
allow for a fully controlled environment, are particularly valuable in gaining
complementary insights into the functioning of matching clearinghouses.
In this paper we report results from an array of experiments in which
subjects have to go through the steps of the deferred-acceptance (DA) al-
gorithm. The two sides of the market alternate—with workers proposing
a match to firms, and firms accepting at most one held offer among those
proposals received and any held worker from the previous turn—with the
process repeating until there are no new proposals. A worker is regarded
as truthful if they propose to firms in the order of their preference. A firm
2Truthful revelation by all participants when there are multiple stable matchings is
generally not an equilibrium of the full-information game, and the identified truncation
strategy is a strong equilibrium for firms, cf. Roth and Sotomayor (1990, Theorems 4.6
and 4.17).
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truncates if it rejects proposals that are actually preferred to the status quo,
not matching with any worker at all.
Our markets are comprised of eight subjects on each side, and partici-
pants have complete information on everyone’s preferences.3 Our subjects
participate in a variety of markets, varying over multiple characteristics: in
market complexity, as captured by the number of stable matchings (either
one, two, or four), and the number of rounds required for the DA algorithm
to converge under truth-telling; in the incentives to manipulate or report un-
truthfully, captured through the size of the core (i.e., the number of stable
matchings) and the degree of manipulation required by the receiving side to
produce their preferred matching; and, finally, in the markets’ cardinal repre-
sentation of preferences, controlled by the payoff differences between matches
for any particular subject.
There are several findings that come out of our analysis: First, stable
matchings are not the norm, as only about one-half of our markets generate
a stable matching. Of these, when markets have multiple stable outcomes,
approximately 29% generate the proposer-best stable matching.
Second, market characteristics are important in determining outcomes.
For instance, both the cardinal representation and the span of the core have
a significant effect on whether outcomes are stable, the overall distance of the
observed outcomes from the core, and the number of turns it takes markets
to converge to an outcome.
Third, individual behavior diverges in a consistent manner from the the-
oretical predictions. In particular, workers are not truthful and firms do not
optimally truncate. Specifically, we find that workers “skip down” their pref-
erence lists. For example, a worker might propose to their third-best firm,
skipping the favorite and second-favorite firm; then, if rejected by their third
favorite, the worker might skip down to the fifth; and so on. This behav-
3Having complete information serves as a natural first step in understanding partic-
ipants’ responses to incentives, void of issues pertaining to belief updating and learning
that would arise in environments with incomplete information.
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ior is clearly at odds with the theory. For firms, we do not detect optimal
truncations: Firms typically choose the best alternative out of any set of
proposals. They do not strategically reject proposals, as the theory predicts,
but instead reject fairly constantly offers from workers in the lower part of
their preference order, with little reaction to market structure.
Our analysis suggests that proposers are sophisticated in their “skipping”
behavior. Workers consider the position they themselves are held in their
target firm’s preferences when making a proposal decision. For example, if a
worker’s first-best firm ranks them as largely undesirable, that worker is less
likely to propose to them. Furthermore, our results suggest that a behavioral
notion of risk might play an important role in workers’ choices.
From a methodological perspective, our experimental design differs from
the few existing experiments on matching mechanisms (which we review in
detail). We require subjects to “produce” the matching by going through the
steps of the algorithm. We could, instead, have asked subjects to report their
preferences, and then produce the matching statically via the DA algorithm.
This alternative design would have the advantage that it mirrors the actual
markets, where workers and firms submit preference lists. We argue, however,
that the game induced by our design is essentially equivalent to the static
procedure, and that our own design has some methodological advantage.
We show that, under a rather natural restriction on the set of strategies,
the mechanism we implement and the standard DA mechanism are isomor-
phic. If workers’ strategies depend only on the set of possible proposals,
and firms’ only on the proposals received, there are standard, simple condi-
tions under which the strategies are equivalent to submitting a preference.
In addition, the submitted preferences give rise to the same outcome as the
preference-revelation mechanism would.
Our design has two important advantages. The first advantage is that
our design enhances subjects’ understanding of their strategic incentives. The
DA algorithm is difficult to understand, and our concern is that experimental
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subjects will find it very difficult to map reported preferences into matching
outcomes. As a result, agents may behave truthfully simply because it is
an easy criterion for how to act in the experiment. Our design is easier to
understand since subjects make the proposals, and decide which to accept
in a piecemeal fashion. The strategic issues are still complicated, but they
are complicated solely due to the strategic uncertainty faced by the players.
The mapping from actions to outcomes is clearer. The second advantage is
related to experimenter demand. If we first give the subjects a preference
list, and then proceed to ask them what their preferences are, we might
contaminate our experiment. The subjects could infer that the experimenters
are interested in whether they report truthfully or not. This may trigger
affective reactions regarding lying, as well as attempts to comply with what
they perceive as the experimenters’ expectation.
1.2 Related Literature
Laboratory experiments focusing on two-sided matching have been relatively
scarce. In terms of design, Haruvy and U¨nver (2007) is the closest to ours.
Haruvy and U¨nver’s main motivation is to study repeated interactions be-
tween firms and workers, and the predictive power of the DA algorithm with
regard to these situations; it is not, like our own experiment, designed to
examine the strategic behavior within the DA algorithm. They run a version
of the sequential “offers by workers, responses by firms” game in 4× 4 mar-
kets. There are several important differences with respect to our design: i)
workers are allowed to repeat offers, thereby creating a larger wedge between
the game played and the DA algorithm; ii) workers and firms are paid for the
results in every turn of the sequence (not only the ultimate matching); and,
iii) their design incorporates automated respondents in some sessions, robots
that automatically accept the best offer, as well as incomplete information
in preferences. They find a substantial number of repeat offers (that most
centralized clearinghouses do not allow) and significantly less “skipping” by
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the proposers than we find.
Harrison and McCabe (1992) implement the preference-revelation DA
mechanism in one 3×3 (3 workers and 3 firms) market and one 4×4 market.
Similar to our own, their design entails common knowledge of all market
participants’ preferences. However, unlike our design, Harrison and McCabe
have subjects repeat play of the market multiple times, and replace many
market roles with computers programmed to play truthfully. In their en-
vironment, outcomes are more in line with the theoretical predictions than
ours. However, they do observe a small degree of “skipping,” as well as firms
failing to successfully manipulate the mechanism.
A number of experimental papers seek to compare the different centralized
mechanisms that are used in practice. Chen and So¨nmez (2006) compare DA
with the Boston and the Top Trading Cycle mechanisms. Their focus is on
the school-choice problem, hence they have strategic agents on only one side
of the market. Chen and So¨nmez implement a preference-revelation design, in
which agents know their own preferences, but not the preferences of the other
participants. In terms of manipulation, they find that proposers (workers)
do not misrepresent their preferences. Featherstone and Niederle (2008) also
compare DA with the Boston mechanism. They find results that are similar
to one of our own, that proposers do not necessarily follow their dominant
strategy to truthfully reveal, and skip highly-ranked potential matches that
are very unlikely to accept them. However, they attribute the effect to weak
market-specific incentives for the skipping player; our own experiments indi-
cate that this effect is more systematic. Featherstone and Mayefsky (2010)
test the DA and Boston mechanisms under incomplete information on the
preferences of others, implementing the proposing side as mechanical truth-
tellers. They find some evidence for limited manipulation of the submitted
preferences by receivers. Their results point to DA being harder to manipu-
late than Boston, as the degree of truncations is smaller than the theoretically
identified optimal amount. Trading Cycles mechanisms in the laboratory un-
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der incomplete information. Automating the proposing side of the market to
reveal truthfully, they find greater manipulation by subjects in the Boston
mechanism, but that the Top Trading Cycle mechanism dominates the other
two procedures when assessed over both truth-telling and the efficiency of
matches.
Finally, a few papers experimentally examine decentralized markets. Echenique,
Katz, and Yariv (2010) examine behavior in decentralized markets and find
that outcomes are in most cases stable. Their study focuses on selection,
and they find that the median stable matching tends to emerge. Kagel and
Roth (2000) analyze the transition from decentralized matching to central-
ized clearinghouses, when the market features lead to inefficient matching
through unraveling. Nalbantian and Schotter (1995) analyze several proce-
dures for matching with transferable utility, decentralized matching among
them, where agents are informed of their own payoffs, but not anyone else’s.
2 Dynamic Design of Centralized Matching
Our paper is an experimental study of strategic behavior in centralized
matching markets. To motivate our approach, consider the following game,
described in Roth and Sotomayor (1990, page 79):
1. Actions in the market are organized in stages. Each stage is divided
into two periods. Within each period, each worker and firm must make
decisions without knowing the decisions of other workers and firms in
that period.
2. In the first period of the first stage, each worker may make at most one
proposal to any firm he chooses (and is also free to make no proposal).
Proposals can only be made by workers.
3. In the second period of the first stage, each firm that has received
proposals may freely reject any or all of them immediately. A firm may
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also keep at most one worker “engaged” by not rejecting their proposal.
4. In the first period of any stage, any worker who was rejected in the
preceding stage may make at most one proposal to any firm he has not
previously proposed to (and been rejected by). In the second period,
each firm may reject any or all of these proposals, including that of any
worker who proposed in an earlier stage and was kept engaged. A firm
may keep at most one worker engaged by not rejecting his proposal.
5. If, at the beginning of any stage, no worker makes a proposal, then the
market ends, and each worker is matched to the firm they are currently
engaged with. Workers who are not engaged with any firms, and firms
who are not engaged with any workers, remain unmatched.4
The game imitates the steps in the DA algorithm (see Section 3 for a de-
scription). In actual centralized matching markets, workers and firms submit
preferences to a central matching authority (as is the case in the National
Residents Matching Program). The authority then uses the submitted pref-
erences as inputs to the DA algorithm, instituting the resulting matching. In
contrast, in the game above, workers and firms decide on proposals at each
step; a matching emerges sequentially through their actions.
Roth and Sotomayor present the game as an introduction to strategic
issues in matching. There is a notion of “straightforward behavior” in the
game. A worker behaves straightfowardly if their proposals go from the
most-preferred firm to the second-most-preferred firm, then to the third-
most preferred, and so on. A firm behaves straightforwardly if at each step
it accepts the most-preferred proposal. Straightfoward behavior corresponds
naturally to truthful behavior in the centralized mechanism. The strategic
issue is whether agents will behave straightforwardly (or truthfully).
4The description is literally Roth and Sotomayor’s, with the only difference that we
recast men/women as workers/firms.
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We directly adopt the above game within our experimental design (de-
tailed in Section 4). Roth and Sotomayor’s use of this game is pedagogical,
our reasons are similar. We want subjects to grasp the relation between their
actions and the resulting outcomes. Subjects best understand the incentives
they face when directly experiencing the steps involved in the matching pro-
cess. In contrast, with the preference-revelation game, subjects need to map
each declared profile into an outcome of the algorithm: This map is com-
plicated, and it is difficult to ensure that laboratory subjects have a clear
understanding of the DA algorithm in the lab.
A second reason for adopting the above game is related to experimenter
demand: If we provide subjects with a preference ranking, and then proceed
to ask them to submit a preference ranking, we worry that subjects will in-
fer the experimenters’ motives. They may, as a result, act with a different
motivation from that we sought to induce. By asking them to present a pref-
erence we present a cue that the experiment is assessing whether they will
behave truthfully or not. This cue may trigger behavior related to the con-
sequences of lying, and/or complying with the experimenters’ expectations.
The resulting experimenter-demand effects could act in either direction, and
are inseparable from the behavior we desire to assess.
Theoretically, under some plausible restrictions on behavior, the above
game and the direct revelation game induced by the DA algorithm are ef-
fectively equivalent. In what follows, we describe some of the theoretical
background for our investigation as well as the formal requirements for this
equivalence.
3 Theoretical Background
3.1 The Underlying Model
Let W and F be disjoint, finite sets. We call the elements of W workers
and the elements of F firms. The sets W and F can represent medical
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residents and hospitals, men and women, parents and schools, etc., that are
to be matched to one another in the market. A matching is a function
µ : W ∪ F → W ∪ F such that for all w ∈ W and f ∈ F ,
1. µ(f) ∈W ∪ {f},
2. µ(w) ∈ F ∪ {w},
3. w = µ(f) if and only if f = µ(w),
where the notation µ(a) = ameans that participant a is unmatched under
µ and f = µ(w) denotes that w and f are matched under µ. We denote the
set of all possible matchings, given the sets W and F , as M.
A preference relation is a linear, transitive, and antisymmetric binary
relation (all preferences are strict, no worker or firm is indifferent over two
distinct partners). A preference relation for a worker w ∈W , denoted Pw, is
understood to be over the set F ∪{w} Similarly, for a firm f ∈ F , Pf denotes
a preference relation over W ∪ {f}. If any participant a prefers remaining
unmatched to being matched with another participant a′ (aPaa′), we will
say that the match µ(a) = a′ is not individually rational ,or unacceptable,
for a. We will assume that each worker (firm) prefers every firm (worker) to
remaining unmatched.5
A preference profile is a list P of preference relations for workers and
firms:
P = ((Pw)w∈W , (Pf )f∈F ) .
As is standard, for i ∈ W ∪ F , we denote by P−i the profile of preferences
for all agents but i. Let P be the set of all possible preference profiles, and
for an agent i ∈ W ∪ F , let Pi denote the set of possible preferences for i.
We assume that preferences are strict. Denote by Rw the weak version of
Pw. So f
′Rwf if f
′ = f or f ′Pwf . The definition of Rf is analogous.
5This fits our experimental design where remaining unmatched is the worst outcome.
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Fix a preference profile P . We say that a pair (w, f) blocks the matching
µ if fPwµ(w), and wPfµ(f). A matching is stable if it is individually rational
and there is no pair that blocks it.6 Finally, denote by S(P ) the set of all
stable matchings.
3.2 Centralized Mechanisms
A mechanism is a function φ : P → M that assigns a matching to each
preference profile. A mechanism is stable if φ(P ) ∈ S(P ) for all P ∈ P.
Gale and Shapley (1962) proved that every preference profile admits a
stable matching, and provided the following algorithm to identify one:
Deferred-Acceptance Algorithm.
Step 0 The set A0 of active workers consists of all the workers. All firms have
no tentative partners.
For k = 1, 2, . . ., repeat the following until Ak is empty:
Step k :
– Each worker w in Ak−1 proposes to the highest-ranked firm accord-
ing to Pw, across all of the firms w has not proposed to in previous
steps of the algorithm.
– Each firm f chooses the best partner (according to Pf), out of the
set of workers that proposed to f in step k, and f ’s tentative match
from step k− 1. This choice is f ’s new tentative match; reject all
other proposals.
– The set Ak formed from the set of all active workers rejected in
this step: either their proposal to a firm was rejected, or they were
tentatively matched in step k − 1, and rejected in favor of a new
proposal.
6Since we assume that partners are always acceptable, any matching is individually
rational under the true preferences.
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Stop
The tentative matching at the end of the last step is the output matching.
Theorem (Gale-Shapley). S(P ) is non empty, and there are two match-
ings µW and µF in S(P ) such that, for all w, f , and µ ∈ S(P ),
µW (w)Rw µ(w)Rw µF (w)
µF (f)Rf µ(f)Rf µW (f).
The matching µW is called worker-best while µF is called firm-best. Be-
yond its theoretical role in establishing existence, the DA algorithm is often
used in centralized markets. For instance, the National Resident Matching
Program uses a close modification of the DA algorithm (where physicians
serve as proposers, or workers, and hospitals as the receivers, or firms).
A mechanism φ defines a direct revelation game: the normal-form game
where the agents in W ∪ F simultaneously report their preferences, so the
strategy space of agent i is Pi, and the outcome of a profile P is given by
φ(P ). Denote by φDA the mechanism defined by the DA procedure.
For an agent i ∈ W ∪ F , truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy if,
for any preference profile P ′i different from the true preferences Pi, and any
profile P˜−i of all agents but i, it is true that
φ(Pi, P˜−i)(i)Ri φ(P
′
i , P˜−i)(i)
A mechanism is strategy proof if truth-telling is weakly dominant for all
agents. As it turns out, we have the following (see Roth and Sotomayor 1990):
Theorem (Strategy Proofness in Stable Mechanisms).
1. In φDA, truth-telling is weakly dominant for workers.
2. No stable mechanism is strategy proof.
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Fix a preference profile P , and suppose that all workers w truthfully
choose Pw as their strategy in the direct-revelation game. We consider the
induced game among firms, where firms simultaneously choose a preference
profile P˜f ∈ Pf . A Nash equilibrium of the induced game is a profile of
preferences (P ′f )f∈F such that,
φ((Pw)w∈W , (P
′
f ′)f ′∈F )(f)Rfφ((Pw)w∈W , P˜f , (P
′
f ′)f ′∈F\f )(f)
for all f ∈ F and P˜f ∈ Pf .
The following result is well known (again, see Roth and Sotomayor 1990):
Theorem (Equilibrium Outcomes in Stable Mechanisms). Consider
any stable mechanism implementing the worker-optimal stable matching for
any reported preferences. In the game induced from truth-telling by the work-
ers, the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of stable
matchings.
3.3 Outcome Equivalence
We present the main intuition behind the equivalence between our game and
the DA direct-revelation game. The main difference arises because agents
in our game can condition their actions on the sequencing of events. We
impose several simple restrictions on strategies (which we later scrutinize us-
ing our experimental data) that make the differences between the two games
irrelevant. In Appendix A.2 we present a formal analysis of this comparison.
Heuristically, a strategy for a particular proposer maps a sequence of past
proposals (with their corresponding outcomes) into a current proposal. We
first restrict strategies to only depend on available proposals. For example,
if w1 can only propose to f1 or f2, his choice should be independent of the
precise sequence of (rejected) proposals that ended with f1 and f2 as the
remaining choices. While this restriction seems realistic, it is easy to write
down examples that violate it. For example, w1 may choose f1 over f2 when
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he proposed to f3 once and was rejected. But he may choose f2 instead if
his proposal to f3 was initially accepted, and rejected several rounds later.
The second restriction is standard in choice theory. A strategy for a
worker is a mapping from sets of available firms into a proposal; for each
set F ′ of firms, either some f ∈ F ′ is proposed to or no proposal is made.
The strategy is then a choice function that can take empty-set values. Under
standard conditions from choice theory (such as the congruence axiom of
Richter (1966)), we can represent such a strategy with a preference relation.7
We make analogous assumptions on firms’ behavior. A firm’s strategy is
a decision on which proposal to accept, given any set of proposals made by
the active workers, and any worker whose proposal the firm holds. Again, the
restrictions we impose are of two types. First, strategies cannot depend on
histories per se. Second, strategies obey certain minimal consistency require-
ments across time, so that they can be represented as preference relations.
We show that a profile of strategies, once represented as a profile of pref-
erence relations, generates the same outcome as the one that would have
been generated in the preference-revelation game φDA. Hence, the incentives
faced by workers and firms in both games are the same.
4 Experimental Design
Our experimental sessions implement a sequence of markets involving two
sides, which we neutrally term colors and foods. In each round, subjects are
randomly assigned a role (red, blue, etc., if a color; apple, banana, etc., if a
food). There are 8 roles in each group, totaling 16 subjects in a market. Sub-
jects can match with at most one subject from the opposite group, and derive
different monetary payoffs from each match. Subjects are fully informed on
7Namely, we can find a preference ranking Pw such that for any set of available firms
F ′, if there is some acceptable firm under Pw, the one that is the most preferred according
to Pw in F
′ is proposed to. The restrictions are reminiscent of the weak axiom of revealed
choice, assuring consistency of observed behavior.
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all the potential payoffs for every possible match in the market by a table on
their computer screens, as depicted in Figure 1, where the first number in
each cell is the corresponding color’s payoff in cents, the second number the
corresponding food’s payoff.8 Remaining unmatched results in a payoff of 0.
For the remainder of the paper, we replace the neutral food/color labels with
the worker/firm frame used previously.
Apple Banana Kiwi Cherry Mango Pear Grape Peach
Red (360,125) (210,175) (60,375) (110,425) (160,475) (10,425) (310,475) (260,325)
Blue (160,475) (360,125) (260,275) (210,475) (60,225) (110,175) (10,225) (310,475)
Green (260,375) (110,325) (360,125) (310,325) (210,425) (60,475) (10,375) (160,375)
Magenta (310,325) (160,425) (110,225) (360,125) (260,275) (10,275) (60,425) (210,175)
Yellow (260,275) (310,275) (160,425) (60,175) (360,125) (10,375) (210,275) (110,225)
Pink (10,425) (210,375) (60,325) (160,375) (310,375) (360,125) (110,175) (260,425)
Cyan (110,225) (260,225) (160,175) (60,275) (210,325) (310,325) (360,125) (10,275)
Orange (260,175) (210,475) (310,475) (10,225) (160,175) (110,225) (60,325) (360,125)
Figure 1: Example Matching Payoffs
In each round, subjects interact within a protocol that mimics the DA
algorithm with workers proposing—the Roth-Sotomayor game discussed in
Section 2. Subjects on differing sides of the market take turns, each composed
of two stages. In the first stage, each worker can make (at most) one proposal
to a firm. In the second stage, each firm that receives proposals, can hold on
to at most one offer rejecting all others. Then, in the third stage, workers
who do not have a held proposal can again make offers. In the fourth stage,
firms that receive new offers chose at most one offer to hold, rejecting all
others. And so on.9 In each proposing stage workers have 30 seconds to
8Full instructions are available at:
http://sites.google.com/site/galeshapley/
9The first of these two stages consist the first turn, the next two the second turn, and
so on. Note that if a firm who held an offer in stage k decides to hold a new offer in stage
k + 2, the worker held in stage k is automatically rejected (and free to make an offer in
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decide whether and to whom they will propose. Firms have 25 seconds to
respond to offers (with a failure to respond to any proposal within the time
limit interpreted as a rejection of all proposals).
In order to induce the Roth-Sotomayor game, we impose a restriction
that workers may not make repeat proposals. So, after proposing to and
receiving a rejection from a particular firm, a worker cannot make any ad-
ditional proposals to that same firm. An experimental round ends whenever
there are no new proposals within a worker-proposing stage.10 As the round
progresses, subjects only observe their own interactions, they do not observe
any proposal/rejection in which they are not directly involved. For instance,
a subject playing the role of a worker knows the order and stages in which
they proposed, and similarly the stages they were rejected in. They do not,
however, observe who else proposed to a particular firm at any time, who
the firms rejected, etc. Similarly, firms only observe proposals made to them,
and their own hold/reject behavior. When the round ends, each held pro-
posal becomes a match, and the corresponding firm and worker receive their
resulting payoffs (according to the common match-payoff table).
Each experimental session is composed of 2 unpaid practice rounds fol-
lowed by 15 paid rounds. Each round uses match payoffs corresponding to
one of 6 preference profiles for the market participants.11 A detailed sum-
mary of the markets used in the sessions appears in Table 1. The number of
times each market was run appears under the N -column.12We designed the
stage k + 3).
10This end condition can have three potential causes: i) All the workers have held
proposals and therefore none is available to make an offer; ii) All workers without held
proposals have no firms to which they have not made a proposal, so no unheld firm can
make an offer; iii) Some workers without a held proposal choose not to make a proposal
in this stage, and the remaining workers have no new proposals to make.
11Subjects have no knowledge on the sequence of markets, and only observe a partic-
ular round’s payoff table at the start of that round. Additionally, rows and columns are
randomly permuted so as to disguise obvious patterns like that in the main diagonal of
Figure 1.
12The full set of markets we used is available at:
http://sites.google.com/site/galeshapley/
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Table 1: Markets Used
Market Arrangement Stable Truncation Core Span Avg. Payoff DA N
Matchings F -Best Unstable W F W F Turns
(I) W-F 1 - 1 - - $2.50 $2.50 8 4
(II) W-F 1 - 7 - - $2.50 $3.48 8 8
F-W 1 - 1 - - $3.48 $2.50 2 4
(III) W-F 2 5 8 1.00 1.75 $2.85 $2.73 4 4
W-F Dev 1 1 - 5 - - $2.85 $2.79 4 8
W-F Dev 2 1 - 8 - - $2.60 $3.60 8 8
F-W 2 4 5 1.75 1.00 $3.60 $2.35 1 4
(IV) W-F 2 1 4 1.00 5.13 $3.60 $1.25 1 8
F-W 2 7 8 5.13 1.00 $3.81 $3.10 11 8
(V)a W-F 2 1 3 1.75 2.00 $3.10 $2.00 5 28
W-F Dev 1 1 - 3 - - $2.53 $2.85 15 8
F-W 2 4 5 2.00 1.75 $3.00 $2.22 6 16
F-W Dev 1 1 - 5 - - $2.85 $2.53 6 8
(VI) W-F 4 7 7 1.00 0.75 $3.35 $3.10 3 4
All 1.67 1.83 4.77 1.21 1.23 $3.04 $2.64 6.1 120
aThis market was run with marginal payoffs of 20/c and 50/c for both the W-F and F-W arrangements.
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markets to vary over several dimensions, detailed as follows:
Market “Complexity.” All but one of our markets have either a unique
stable outcome or two disjoint, stable matchings.13 We designed the markets
to vary in the number of turns14 required for the DA algorithm to converge
under truth-telling, as well as the sensitivity of outcomes to truncation by
firms (the receiving side of the market). The latter is captured in two ways:
First, we calculate the number of workers that firms must truncate in order to
achieve their most-preferred stable matching, assuming that workers behave
truthfully and firms truncate jointly.15 Second, we calculate the minimal
number of workers firms must jointly (and uniformly) truncate to gener-
ate an unmatched partner. This measure captures the sensitivity of stable
matchings to truncation.
Cardinal Representation.Match payoffs in cents are constructed from
each market’s ordinal preference profile. The marginal decrease between an
agent’s n-th and (n + 1)-th favorite partners is fixed at 50/c in the majority
of markets. In order to gauge the effects of cardinal representations within
our markets, we use marginal decreases of just 20/c in one of the baseline
markets, Market (V).16 The average payment across agents (and across stable
13One market, (VI), was designed to provide some insight on the effects of market size
on outcomes and was composed of two 4× 4 embedded markets (so that any agent within
a submarket preferred to match with anyone from that submarket over anyone from the
other). Each of the sub-markets entailed two stable matchings, leading to 4 market-wide
stable matchings. However, each participant in this market had at most two potential
stable match partners.
14Defining a turn as the two consecutive stages, a proposal from workers, and the stage
directly following it in which firms respond.
15Formally, this number is calculated as follows. Suppose for each firm i the firm-
optimal stable matching assigns a worker ranked as ri ∈ {1, .., 8} (ri = 1 corresponding
to firm i’s most preferred worker). We compute the minimal number t ∈ {1, ..., 8} such
that if each agent i truncates the bottom min{t, 8 − ri} workers, the worker-optimal
stable matching would be implemented under the worker-proposing DA mechanism if
workers behave truthfully. Small truncation values t correspond to smaller required (joint)
deviations from truthful revelation to implement the firm-optimal stable matching.
16In theory, payoff representations of preferences do not affect incentives in the complete
information DA mechanism, nor do they matter for the set of stable matchings.
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matchings when there were two) is between $2.50 and $3.20.17 The average
payoff, given truthful revelation on both sides of the market, is separately
given in the Average Payoff column for workers and firms. Given truthful
behavior, workers should earn an extra 40/c per round—though across market
variations this difference varies from $1.00 less than firms through to $2.35
more.
Incentives to Manipulate and Core Size. Three markets with mul-
tiple stable matchings, Markets (III), (IV), and (V), are duplicated with the
roles of workers and firms reversed.18 This reversal provides information on
the effects from the differing incentives of proposers and receivers. The re-
versed markets are indicated in the Arrangement column of Table 1, where
W-F is the original setting and F-W is the market in which roles are reversed.
In addition, we alter two of these markets, (III) and (V), by making minor
modifications to preferences—changing the ranking of just one participant
so as to produce a blocking pair—and, thereby induce a similar market with
a unique stable matching. For Market (III), two different modifications are
introduced to make the worker-optimal and firm-optimal stable matching
from the original market the unique stable outcome (with resulting markets
denoted by W-F Dev 1 and W-F Dev 2, respectively). In a similar fash-
ion, for Market (V) W-F Dev 1, we introduce a small change to the W-F
market to focus on the original’s worker-optimal stable matching. The same
deviated market has the roles reversed in F-W Dev 1, to achieve the firm-
optimal stable outcome as the unique matching when compared against the
F-W orientation.
Markets also differ in the size of the core. For each worker we calculate
the distance in rank position between their best and worst stable partner,
17For each profile of preferences, we chose payoffs to minimize this average under two
constraints: i) this average is above $2.50; and ii) each subject’s payoffs from any match
exceeds 5/c.
18Keeping any particular subject i’s preference profile fixed, we switch their market
side, firms to workers, and vice versa. This is equivalent to retaining labels and using the
firm-proposing DA algorithm.
19
and average these values across workers. We call the resulting number the
workers’ “core span.” The analogous calculation is also given for the firms.
Core spans vary between 0 (when the stable matching is unique) and 5.13.19
A large core span for one side corresponds to greater incentives for achieving
that side’s optimal stable partner.
Our sessions were all run at the California Social Science Experimental
Laboratory (CASSEL), and implemented using a variation of the multi-stage
software. In total, 128 subjects were recruited; all were UCLA undergradu-
ates, and each subject participated in just one session. The average payment
per subject was $41 (with a standard deviation of $5), combined with a $5
show-up payment.
5 Aggregate Outcomes
The main indicators for the aggregate results across our experimental markets
appear in Table 2. There are several layers we go through in our analysis
below. First, we show that a significant fraction of our markets did not end
up in a stable matching, and that the matchings they did end up in are
suggestive of workers rather than firms behaving in an untruthful fashion.
Second, when markets entail multiple stable matchings, we inspect which
ones get selected. In line with subjects not behaving truthfully, we see that a
large majority of markets end up at or close to the firm-best stable matching.
Last, we study the tangible outcomes subjects experienced in our markets,
namely time spent and payoffs earned.
19When there are two stable outcomes, the two matchings were designed to be disjoint—
that is, every worker and firm’s best and worst stable partner are different—so the core
span is at least 1 in these markets.
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Table 2: Aggregate Outcomes
Market Arrangement Stable W-Best (Closer) Distance Unmatched ∆ Payoff Turns N
W F
(I) W-F 25.0% - 0.71 6.3% -3.3/c 3.3/c 9.3 4
(II) W-F 50.0% - 0.92 1.6% 0.0/c -17.5/c 8.9 8
F-W 25.0% - 1.41 9.4% -22.4/c 8.6/c 9.0 4
(III) W-F 50.0% 50.0% (50%) 0.78 3.1% -22.6/c -53.2/c 7.3 4
W-F Dev 1 37.5% - 1.03 1.6% -8.73/c 15.1/c 6.0 8
W-F Dev 2 87.5% - 0.69 0.0% 0.0/c -5.5/c 8.4 8
F-W 50.0% 50.0% (25%) 0.84 6.3% -58.3/c -11.7/c 8.0 4
(IV) W-F 62.5% 0.0% (0%) 1.79 6.3% -62.5/c -4.1/c 4.0 8
F-W 62.5% 100.0% (100%) 1.20 0.0% -22.66/c -58.6/c 8.0 8
(V) W-F 53.6% 0.0% (7.1%) 1.01 3.1% -64.3/c -5.7/c 10.7 28
W-F Dev 1 62.5% - 1.13 4.7% -2.5/c 0.8/c 8.3 8
F-W 18.8% 33.3% (37.5%) 0.86 3.1% -39.5/c -25.2/c 11.4 16
F-W Dev 1 25.0% - 1.52 6.3% -44.1/c 34.2/c 10.1 8
(VI) W-F 75.0% 66.7% (75%) 0.20 0.0% -15.6/c -29.7/c 3.5 4
All 48.3% 28.6% (18.3%) 1.05 3.3% -26.2/c -10.6/c 8.8 120
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5.1 Proximity to Stable Matchings
Our experimental markets do not consistently produce a stable outcome.
In fact, just half of the markets result in a stable matching—48% for the
markets with a unique stable matching and 49% of those with multiple stable
matchings. The Stable column contains the percentages for markets in that
arrangement that end in a stable matching.
Markets resulting in an unstable matching have an average of 5.5 blocking
pairs. For the 62 unstable markets, 32 have unmatched subjects, while the
remaining 30 markets have all the participants matched (with an average of
3.5 blocking pairs per unstable market). Examining the available blocking
pairs, we can classify markets into two broad categories. First, there are
markets with available blocking pairs: blocking pairs that could still form at
the final stage of the market, but do not. Available blocking pairs necessarily
involve unmatched subjects.20 Alternatively, there are the unavailable block-
ing pairs: blocking pairs that cannot form because the worker in the pair was
either previously rejected by the firm in the pair, or is held by another firm,
and subsequently has no agency to make a proposal to form the blocking
pair.
Of the 32 markets in which some subjects end the process unmatched, 8
markets had an available blocking pair. Of the remaining 24 markets with
unmatched subjects, the unmatched workers were rejected by every blocking
firm. In particular, this implies that all unmatched firms must have rejected
the unmatched workers at some point in the round. Column Unmatched in
Table 2 provides the fraction of unmatched workers by market arrangement.
The high rates of unstable outcomes must be due to deviations from
truthful reporting. We can associate unstable outcomes to the agents who
were responsible by misrepresenting their preferences. To that end, it is useful
20This must be a pair comprised of an unmatched worker and a firm such that: i) the
firm has not rejected the worker; and ii) the firm is either unmatched or prefers the worker
to her current match.
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to consider unstable markets that terminate with all participants matched.
Consider a worker-firm blocking pair (w, f) for one such matching µ. The
blocking pair can be of two types, either: i) firm f previously rejected w
(equivalent to f submitting a preference report ranking their ultimate match
µ(f) preferable to w, in contradiction to the definition of (w, f) blocking µ);
or ii) worker w never proposes to firm f , but is matched to another firm
µ(w) (equivalent to w stating the current match µ(w) is preferred to f).
From the 30 unstable, fully-matched markets, a third have blocking pairs
in both categories, 20% only have blocking pairs corresponding to category
(i), where the firms effectively misstate their preferences, and the remaining
47% have only blocking pairs corresponding to category (ii), where workers
misstate their preferences. This is suggestive of the substantive misreporting
that takes place in our markets and, in particular, the volume of outcomes
that are a direct result of proposers misstating their preferences.21 We further
examine the behavior that produces these results in Section 7.
Given the prevalence of markets culminating in unstable matchings, it
is interesting to see how far the resulting matchings are from the set of
stable matchings. We use subjects’ preference rankings to create a distance
measure for all markets at an unstable outcome. Specifically, we measure
the average distance in ranking for each individual between their final match
(defining the unmatched outcome as rank 9), and the closest rank of a stable
match partner. The results are in the column titled Distance in Table 2. On
average, subjects were approximately one position away from a stable-match
partner across all unstable matches, corresponding to an approximate loss
of 50/c per person (the exception being those markets with lower marginal
differences between partner payoffs, where this loss was 20/c).22
21Markets that are not fully matched produce a similar result. As outlined above, all
unstable matchings with unmatched subjects and no available blocking pairs must have
reached this situation through at least one firm misstating their preferences. For the 24
markets with unmatched subjects and no available blocking pairs, 13 contain blocking
pairs with workers who failed to make a proposal to the blocking firm.
22The overall distance measure for each market arrangement may be calculated by mul-
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5.2 Selection of Stable Matchings
We examine those markets with multiple stable matchings and ask which
matching the observed outcome is closest to. The W -Best column gives
the fraction of stable outcomes that were W -optimal, while the figure in
parentheses is the fraction of rounds in which the market’s outcome is closer
to the worker-best outcome than the firm-best, measured in the same manner
as Distance.
For the markets with multiple stable matchings that yield a stable out-
come, 28.6% of the outcomes are at the proposer-best, the outcome resulting
from truth-telling in the DA mechanism. However, there is large variation
across market arrangements. All stable outcomes in Market (IV) W-F are
at the firm-best match, all those under the F-W orientation at the worker-
best. Referring back to the truncation column in Table 2, we see that this
market is particularly sensitive in the W-F arrangement, reaching the firm
best under only a very small preference truncation. Conversely, attaining the
firm-best outcome in the F-W order requires extreme truncation by all agents.
Inspection of the other markets suggests this as a general trend: When the
truncation requirement is low, the stable matching implemented is always the
firm-best. With middling-levels of truncation required, the stable matching
varies, and with extreme truncation required, the stable matching is always
the worker-optimal.
5.3 Tangible Outcomes: Time and Payoffs
5.3.1 Unraveling Time
On average, each market takes approximately 9 turns to finish (see column
Turns), with the average turn taking 21.5 seconds.Using truth-telling behav-
ior as a benchmark, we compare the actual number of turns taken against
tiplying our distance number by the percentage of unstable matches in a market, as all
stable matches are by definition distance 0 from a stable matching.
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the predicted number. We find that markets take an extra 2.5 turns to end,
and that only 24 out of 120 markets end within the truth-telling number of
turns. In particular, these observations suggest that on the market level, any
behavior intended to shorten time spent in the experiment was unsuccessful.
5.3.2 Average Payoffs
Consider the average worker in our average market. Conditional on the
worker-best outcome being chosen, his expected payoff is $3.02 per round;
and if the firm-best is chosen, it is $2.57. The observed figures are closer
to the latter, lower, prediction, $2.66. Conducting the same exercise for the
firm side of the market, the average firm’s expected payoff varies between
$2.66 per round if the worker-best outcome is selected, and $3.09 under the
firm-best. The observed value is $2.91, in between these two figures.23 These
figures are suggestive of outcomes being closer to the firm-best matching but
not strongly so.
Column ∆-Payoff provides the average difference in the actual payment
from that of the best outcome by market side (that is, the sub-column cor-
responding to workers contains the difference between the average worker’s
payoff per round and under the worker-best stable matching. Similarly for
the sub-column corresponding to firms24). This column contains similar in-
formation to the Distance and W -Closer columns, but provides some inter-
esting differences. In some markets the average matched firms achieve better
outcomes than their most preferred stable match partner. In these markets,
there is a unique stable outcome, and the average matched worker is far-
ing worse. As will be echoed in the individual analysis below, the reason
for these results is that workers in these markets propose to a firm that is
ranked below their stable match partner, one that values them more highly
23Accounting for unmatched subjects raises these observed averages by approximately
8/c.
24These averages are conditional on agents being matched, unmatched subjects are not
affecting these figures directly.
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than their own stable partner. The ensuing results of such “skips” lead to
an unmatched firm and worker. In fact, conditional on being matched, firms
earn, on average, 6/c more than the payoffs generated by their stable match
partners in those markets with a unique stable matching. In markets with
multiple stable matchings, both sides fare poorly, though the firms are closer
in dollar and relative terms to their best stable outcomes.25
6 Market Characteristics
We learn from the previous discussion that there is one aspect of a mar-
ket that predicts which stable matching the market produces. How complex
the market is to manipulate for firms, as measured by the minimal level of
truncation required by firms to establish their preferred matching, is a good
predictor of whether the outcome is the worker- or the firm-best matching.
We now formalize this idea, and inspect other market characteristics that
affect outcomes. Table 3 provides results from several descriptive regressions
explaining different dimensions of observed outcomes, using the market char-
acteristics outlined in Section 4 as regressors. The first column outlines the
broad effect these design metrics have on a market’s duration, the observed
number of turns. The next three measures relate to stability: the mini-
mum distance to a stable outcome; the total number of blocking pairs; and
a dummy variable indicating whether the final matching was stable or not.
Finally, the last column looks at the proximity to the worker-best matching,
the left-hand-side variable being a dummy taking the value of 1 when the
resulting matching is closer to the worker-best outcome, and restricting the
data to those markets with multiple stable matchings.
Formally, we use the following regressors: The first, Round No., takes
values from 1 to 15 and represents the position in the sequence of markets
25At the end of the experiment, we asked subjects to reflect on the experiment and
express their preference over having the role of worker or firm. In line with these payoff
differences, 79.6% expressed a preference for the firm role.
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Table 3: Descriptive Outcome Regressions
Turns Distance Blocking Stable Closer to
Pairs Outcome W-Best
Round No. -0.058 -0.176 0.161 0.005 -0.004∗
(0.082) (0.137) (0.126) (0.005) (0.002)
Low marginals for workers 0.001 0.101∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗ -0.390∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.025) (0.030) (0.053) (0.024) (0.202)
Low marginals for firms 0.065∗∗∗ -0.028∗ -0.026∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.013) (0.010) (0.023) (0.053)
Worker core span 0.145∗ -0.046 -0.011 0.037 0.102∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.138) (0.118) (0.049) (0.044)
Firm core span -0.096 0.002 0.060 0.024 -0.048
(0.056) (0.091) (0.078) (0.020) (0.055)
Truncation level for F-best -0.109 -0.039 -0.094 -0.017 0.135∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.125) (0.100) (0.037) (0.032)
N 120 120 120 120 72
Stable Outcome and Closer to W-Best give the marginal effects from a probit regression; all other columns are elasticities
obtained from an OLS regression. Standard errors given in parentheses below the estimates, and are clustered by market.
Significance levels indicated as follows:∗∗∗=99%, ∗∗=95%, and ∗=90%.
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within an experimental session–the first paid round takes value 1, the last
round value 15. The next two regressors capture the effect of the low 20/c
marginals (as opposed to the standard 50/c) on outcomes. The final three
regressors are metrics from Table 1, corresponding to the average distance
(core span) between the extremal stable matchings, for workers and firms,
respectively, and the truncation level firms are required to use to produce
the firm-optimal stable matching (Truncation-F from Table 1).
We first note that Round No. does not carry much explanatory power
in our regressions, indicating limited learning or convergence throughout an
experimental session.
In terms of market attributes, the different columns highlight several
points. First, there does not seem to be any clear pattern in the number of
turns taken to conclude a market, as the regression is jointly and individually
insignificant at standard levels. Second, the regressions on measures of mar-
ket stability indicate that low-powered incentives seem to have the strongest
effect: Low marginals for proposers significantly increase instability across all
three measures. Low marginals for the receivers, the firms, have the opposite
effect, increasing outcome stability. Finally, consistent with the casual obser-
vation in Section 5, we find that the greater the required truncation levels,
and the weaker the firm’s incentives, the more likely it is that the observed
outcome is closer to the worker-best matching. Greater worker incentives
(namely, a larger distance between the two stable matchings for the workers)
have the same effect.
7 Individual Behavior
The previous section depicts aggregate market outcomes, frequently corre-
sponding to instability. But these aggregate measures are the product of 16
individuals’ choice sequences. We now begin an analysis of the individual
responses within the experiment.
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Figure 2: Distributions of Straightforward/Truthful Play, by Group.
An important finding of the paper is that workers (proposers) do not
behave “straightforwardly,” in the sense defined in Section 2. That is, their
proposals do not track their preference rankings. Firms’ (receivers’) behav-
ior, on the other hand, is largely straightforward: firms (tentatively) accept
proposals from the most-preferred workers in the vast majority of cases. Fig-
ure 2 presents the empirical distribution for straightforward, or truthful, play
by workers and firms, where each data point represents the fraction of inter-
actions in which a specific subject in each group reveals straightforwardly.
The results are striking. The theory predicts that workers will truthfully
reveal their preferences, and firms will strategically misrepresent to achieve
better outcomes, most notably (and simply) by truncating preference order-
ings. In the experiment, over half the subjects acting as firms behave truth-
fully in all their experimental interactions within this role, with two-thirds
reporting truthfully more than 90% of the time. The distribution of truth-
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telling for workers is more uniform—and stochastically dominated by that
for firms—with approximately one-third of the workers behaving straightfor-
wardly less than half of the time. In what follows we analyze individuals’
behavior in detail.
7.1 Truncation and Skipping
As mentioned above, in the DA procedure workers have a dominant strategy
to truthfully reveal their preferences; conversely, if markets have more than
one stable matching, firms have a strategic incentive to misrepresent. One
easy way of implementing a better stable matching is by truncating the true
preferences—disingenuously stating that an acceptable match is less preferred
than remaining unmatched.
If every firm were to truncate their preferences below their firm-best stable
partner, then the firm-best stable matching would be the resulting outcome.
In fact, in many markets a lower degree of truncation can be used by firms
to produce their preferred stable matching (see Table 1). Given our data,
we can check for the extent of truncation firms are using by direct inference:
when an unmatched firm rejects all those proposing in a turn, this is equiva-
lent to stating that the proposals all come from (purportedly) unacceptable
workers.26
Table 4(a) presents the probability of rejecting all those proposing condi-
tional on the true ranking of the best proposer. That is, for any rank k, we
track all the events at which a firm (with no tentative acceptances) receives
proposals, the best of which is from their k’th ranked partner. The number
of these events across all rounds is in column N , and the number in the first
round is in the column titled N1. We calculate the fraction of times that all
of these proposals were rejected both across rounds, and in the first round.
26We do not observe truncations in any other case. For instance, consider the situation
in which two workers, w and w
′
propose to a particular firm in the same round, and w
′
is
accepted. In this situation we cannot infer whether w was acceptable or unacceptable, all
we observe is that w
′
is preferred to w, and that w
′
is preferred to no match at all.
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When the proposer is the first-best (rank 1), this figure is close to zero. In
fact, truncations within the upper-half of the preference ordering are rare.
As the ranking of the best offer falls (toward 8) the truncation probabilities
increase, reaching a probability of rejection of 58.2% for the lowest-ranked
proposer. This truncation behavior does not qualitatively differ between the
first and subsequent periods, and both exhibit large probabilities in the final
two positions of the preference ordering.27
The results could be influenced by the large number of observations in
particular markets (the two arrangements W-F and F-W of Market (V), for
instance). Analyzing each of the markets separately does not change the
results drastically.28
However, the truncation strategies are not the complete story. The theory
makes clear that proposers have a dominant strategy to truthfully reveal
their preferences. We now analyze whether workers follow this dominant
strategy, and move in sequence through their preference list. Table 4(b)
details the probability with which workers propose to the highest-ranked firm
from those available: the set of firms that the worker has not yet proposed
to. The overall probability is 66.2%, consistent with our initial observations
that a substantial number of workers do not make offers in order of their
true preferences. The table also reports how these probabilities vary with
what may serve as a natural proxy for the likelihood that the proposal will
be accepted, the ranking of the worker in the eyes of the targeted firm, the
reflected ranking. Specifically, we report the probabilities workers propose
to their most-preferred available firm, conditioning on how they themselves
stand in the ranking of that firm.29 In order to provide some control over
27Explicitly controlling for the turn number in which the decisions is made generates no
effect.
28For Market (V), the probability of truncating within the top half of the preference
ordering is 3.2% for the W-F treatment, 3.3% in the F-W treatment, and 2.4% for all
other markets. For the bottom half, the respective numbers are 31.2%, 46.2%, and 30.6%.
29For instance, the first row of the table, corresponding to a worker rank of 1, details
the probability with which a worker proposes to the best firm that has not been ruled
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Table 4: Individual Behavior
(a) Truncation Levels
Best offer Prob. of rejecting (%) Subsample
rank All turns First turn N N1
1
0.2
(0.2)
0.0
(−)
551 80
2
1.1
(0.6)
0.0
(−)
472 118
3
3.2
(1.4)
4.5
(2.1)
402 132
4
8.8
(2.2)
12.1
(3.6)
317 115
5
21.0
(4.8)
19.4
(6.4)
119 36
6
21.8
(5.1)
20.0
(9.7)
87 15
7
45.6
(7.6)
63.6
(14.6)
57 11
8
58.2
(6.9)
50.0
(10.7)
55 22
All 6.6 9.1 2060 529
(b) Skipping
Worker Prob. of proposing (%) Subsample
rank All turns First turn N N1
1
93.5
(2.6)
96.8
(3.1)
92 32
2
78.4
(2.9)
86.1
(3.9)
208 79
3
66.9
(2.6)
81.6
(3.3)
317 141
4
76.6
(1.9
75.3
(3.2)
487 186
5
61.6)
(2.5)
59.1
(4.0)
383 154
6
72.4
(2.4)
60.6
(5.0)
351 94
7
62.1
(2.7)
38.1
(7.5)
314 42
8
46.6
(2.3)
39.2
(3.7)
483 176
All 66.2 9.1 2635 904
Standard errors, clustered by subject, are given in parentheses below sample probabilities. Results were obtained via
Probit models with appropriate dummies. Maximum-likelihood estimates for the marginal effects are the subsample mean, as
dummy variables induce a partition over the data, but the errors are modeled jointly across each column.
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any time effects within a market, we again report separately the probabilities
for the first turn within a round (with N and N1 the number of observations
over all turns and over the first turn, respectively).
The results illustrate a clear pattern in proposal behavior; workers are not
following their dominant strategy. Instead the workers are skipping highly
ranked firms who are likely to reject them. This pattern is somewhat more
pronounced, though qualitatively similar, for behavior in the first turn of a
round.30
In many instances this skipping behavior would be inconsequential for
outcomes: for instance, if every worker were to skip down to an instituted
stable matching, the game would end in a single turn and yield that stable
matching. However, in the first turn 19.5% of workers skip down below their
own optimal-match partner, and 10.2% skip down to firms ranked below the
firm-optimal stable match. Across all turns, conditioning on the availability
of the stable partners, 17.2% of workers skip below their own worker-optimal
partner, and 8.5% below their firm-optimal partner. We see no qualitative
difference between the first and subsequent turns.31
Figure 3 illustrates the absolute size of skipping behavior as a cumulative
distribution function, classifying the rank of the truthful choice into three
categories: the top three, the middle two, and the bottom three. It is easy to
see from the graph that the skipping behavior when workers’ truthful choices
do not rank them highly stochastically dominates the behavior when their
truthful choices rank them higher.
out, where that firm ranks them as their top candidate; when the worker’s rank is 8, the
worker’s best current outcome ranks them as the worst match outcome overall.
30There is no significant effect from period of play on either the skipping behavior of
workers or the truncation decisions of firms. This is true when including the effect as a
regressor across all ranks of best proposal, or in subsamples with interacted effects.
31This behavior is consistent with the observations of Harrison and McCabe (1992) and
Featherstone and Niederle (2008), who observe evidence of proposer skipping in different
environments while employing the direct-revelation mechanism.
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Figure 3: Size of Skip Conditional on Truthful Choice’s Ranking
7.2 Risk Aversion
There is complete information in our experimental design, but given how
complex the markets are, we explore how strategic risk may have affected
subjects’ behavior. We imagine that risk-averse workers, who are uncertain
about the behavior of others, may want to “skip” in a similar fashion to what
we observe.
In order to assess the level of this “riskiness” we make some stark behav-
ioral assumptions. First, we assume that subjects in worker roles internalize
the truncation probabilities that the firms are using, but understand their
choice as that of a simple static lottery: if the firm they propose to accepts
their offer they win the lottery, and earn the payoff from matching with
that firm; if the firm rejects, then they lose the lottery, and receive a fixed
payment representing the perceived “outside option.” Therefore, in the first
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round, each worker acts as if they are choosing from eight potential lotteries,
choosing the best lottery according to their risk preferences.
We parameterize risk preferences with the commonly used constant rel-
ative risk aversion specification over monetary payoffs. So the particular
choice is made according to:
max
f∈F
pf · pi
1−σ
f + (1− pf ) · pi
1−σ,
where pf is the probability choice firm f will reject the proposer, pif is the
monetary payoff from choice f , and pi is a common continuation value.
Calculating pf via the probabilities given in Table 4(b),we estimate a
risk coefficient of σ of 0.60, and an outside-option payment pi of $2.20.32
This estimate for the risk aversion is similar to that observed in experiments
designed to estimate this parameter through explicit lottery choice.(see Holt
and Laury 2002, Table 3).
We stress that the risk hypothesis is only one potential explanation for the
observed skipping, and relies heavily on strong behavioral assumptions that
reformulate the complex game we use as a choice over simple lotteries.We
interpret this estimation as a failure to reject, rather than strong evidence
supporting this model of behavior.
8 Conclusion
The paper reports observations from experiments emulating a highly utilized
matching clearinghouse, the deferred-acceptance (DA) mechanism. We stud-
ied a large set of markets, varying in their complexity, incentives to truthfully
reveal preferences, and cardinal representations. Several important insights
32We use a non-linear logit specification over the possible lotteries, and restrict attention
to the first round of choices to ensure a constant choice size. The 99% confidence interval
for σ is [0.57, 0.63], while that for pi is [172, 258] cents, where these intervals are obtained
by a bootstrap of size 1,000.
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emerge from our experiments. First, less than half of the markets generated
a stable matching. Of those markets with multiple stable matchings that
resulted in a stable outcome, over 70% concluded in the receiver-best stable
matching. Since truthful revelation of preferences generates the proposer-
best outcome, these results are suggestive of manipulation. In fact, our
second set of insights regards the consistent deviations from truthful behav-
ior. Proposers frequently skipped down their preference ordering, preferring
to propose early to those more likely to accept them. Receivers, however,
appeared to by and large behave in an effectively truthful manner, accepting
the best offer at each point in time. This is in contrast to the underlying the-
oretical predictions that proposers behave truthfully and receivers not (most
simply, by truncating preferences). Last, we show that market attributes
have a significant impact on outcomes. For instance, both the cardinal rep-
resentation and core size influence whether outcomes are stable. They also
impact the overall distance of observed outcomes from the core, and the
number of turns it takes markets to converge to the final outcome.
The study has potentially important practical implications given the wide
use of the DA mechanism. Indeed, consider the medical residents match in
the U.S. (the NRMP), involving over 40, 000 participants each year. The
behavior we observe in the lab could translate into medical residents from
top programs applying to top-tier residencies, while those from less well-
regarded schools aiming at middle-ranked hospitals and below. Naturally,
outcomes are then very fragile to mistakes (by residents) regarding how low
to apply, even if hospitals submit their preferences truthfully. While the
centralized system is designed to generate stable matchings, such behavior
may cause the system to converge to outcomes that are, in fact, unstable.
The paper opens the door for several directions for future research. In
light of the behavior we observe, it would be important to understand for-
mally how fragile outcomes are to particular skipping heuristics by proposers.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to discern how certain forms of commu-
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nication affect outcomes in mechanisms such as those we study (for instance,
interviews could be thought of as match quality signals that are revealed prior
to the enactment of the centralized clearinghouse). It would also be crucial to
determine how incomplete information regarding others’ preferences, which
is likely in such large markets as the NRMP, shapes outcomes and behav-
ior in matching clearinghouses, particularly in view of the evidence we see
suggesting the importance of risk aversion in our experimental markets.
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A Dynamic Clearinghouses
A.1 Static and Dynamic Gale-Shapley Mechanisms
The following example, appearing in Niederle and Yariv (2010), illustrates
how weakly dominated strategies on the parts of workers alone do not lead
to the same predictions in the static and dynamic versions of the Deferred
Acceptance mechanism.
Example (Additional Equilibria Outcomes in the Dynamic Ver-
sion of Deferred Acceptance). Consider a market consisting of work-
ers {W1,W2,W3} and firms {F1, F2, F3} , where all agents prefer to be
matched rather than unmatched. Let the induced ordinal preferences % of
the three workers and colors be given by:
W1 : F2 ≻ F1 ≻ F3
W2 : F1 ≻ F2 ≻ F3
W3 : F1 ≻ F2 ≻ F3
,
F1: W1 ≻ W3 ≻ W2
F2: W2 ≻ W1 ≻ W3
F3: W1 ≻W3 ≻ W2
.
The unique stable matching µ is given below (where we use the convention
that each column in the matrix denotes a match between the specified worker
and color), µ(Wi) = Fi for all i. In particular, the Gale Shapley mechanism
entails a unique equilibrium in weakly undominated strategies yielding µ.
Nonetheless, the matching µ˜ below (in whichW1 andW2 swap colors relative
to µ) can be induced in our dynamic mechanism.
µ =
(
W1 W2 W3
F1 F2 F3
)
, µ˜ =
(
W1 W2 W3
F2 F1 F3
)
.
Indeed, here is a profile in weakly undominated strategies:
Period 1: worker W3 makes an offer to F3 who accepts.
Period 2: worker W1 makes an offer to F2 and W2 makes an offer to
F1 who accept.
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Upon any deviation, offers from agents other than the stable match or the
most preferred match are rejected and all revert to emulating the Deferred
Acceptance strategies (in particular, F1 rejects an offer from W3).
Notice that time plays an important role in the construction of this equi-
librium. Indeed, as highlighted Niederle and Yariv (2010), the crucial element
driving this construction is the ability of some participants to commit and of
others to condition their behavior on observed market outcomes (note that
once W3 is accepted, he cannot escape F3).33
A.2 Outcome and Strategic Equivalence
In the dynamic setup, at each period t agents monitor only partial activity
in the market. We now describe the information each agent has throughout
the game. At the beginning of period t, each worker w observes a history
that consists of the (timed) offers the worker made and the responses of firms
to those offers, denoted by r for rejection and h for holding (where we use
the notational convention that an offer to no firm is denoted as an offer to
∅ that is immediately rejected):
hWt,w ∈ ((F ∪∅)× {r, h})
t−1 .
The set of all possible histories at time t for worker w is denoted by HWt,w.
In addition, at each period t, suppose firms f1, ..., fk(t−1) rejected offers
from worker w in periods 1, ..., t−1. Denote by F˜ tw =
{
f |f /∈
{
f1, ..., fk(t−1)
}}
the set of firms that have not rejected worker w yet.
Each firm acts in the second stage of each period t and observes a history
that consists of all (timed) offers she received and a (timed) sequence of offers
33Interestingly, this equilibrium is not robust in that it is not sequential (for instance,
F1 would need to believe that other agents will deviate as well when observing an offer
from W3, but the market does not offer enough monitoring for that).
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she held:34
hFt,f ∈
(
2W
)t
×
(
2W
)t
.
The set of all possible histories at time t for firm f is denoted by HFt,f .
In addition, at each period t, suppose workers w1, ..., wk(t−1) made offers
to firm f in periods 1, ..., t. Denote by W˜ tf =
{
w|w /∈
{
w1, ..., wk(t−1)
}}
the
set of workers that have not made an offer to firm f.
A strategy for worker w is a collection of mappings
{
σWt,w
}
, where σWt,w :
HWt,w → F ∪∅, and whenever at time t, σ
W
t,w
(
hWt,w
)
6= ∅ then σWt,w
(
hWt,w
)
∈ F˜ tw.
A strategy for firm f is a collection of mappings
{
σFt,f
}
, where σFt,f : H
F
t,f →
(W ∪∅)2
W×(W∪∅) . That is, after each history, the firm’s strategy specifies
which worker (if any) would be held from a menu of worker offers (when
possibly already holding an offer).
Note that, for workers, we could, in fact, describe the strategy as: σWt,w :
HWt,w → {P (w)} (when defining a firm approached at later periods as less
preferred).
If agents condition their behavior on time per se, the dynamic setup may,
in principle, lead to very different outcomes than the static one. We make
the following assumptions:
Assumption (Stationarity) Strategies do not depend on sequencing:
• For any worker w, there exists τWw : 2
F → F ∪ ∅, such that
whenever at time t worker w is not held and under history hWt,w,
F˜ tw are the firms he can make an offer to, σ
W
t,w
(
hWt,w
)
= τWw
(
F˜ tw
)
.
• For any firm f, there exists τFf : 2
W× (W ∪∅)→ W∪∅, such that
whenever at time t firm f has observed history hFt,f , under which
she holds an offer from f ∈ F ∪∅ (where holding an offer from ∅
34An offer of worker w to firm f that is held from period t to t’ is recorded as an offer
made in periods t, t + 1, ..., t’ that is held by the firm in each of these periods. We use a
similar convention for workers.
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is interpreted as not holding an offer), and the set of workers who
made her an offer in t is W˜ , then σFt,f
(
hFt,f
)
= τFf
(
W˜ , w
)
.
Assume that workers make offers whenever they can.
Stationarity in and of itself does not assure a representation through a
preference ranking. Indeed, if τWw (f1, f2) = f1, but τ
W
w (f1, f2, f3) = f2,
this would not be consistent with a preference ordering. Namely, a form
of independence of irrelevant alternatives is being violated. Furthermore, if
τWw (f1, f2) = f1, τ
W
w (f2, f3) = f2, and τ
W
w (f3, f1) = f3, we would obtain a
violation of transitivity when trying to explain behavior through a preference
ordering. This is in the spirit of violations of the weak axiom of revealed
preferences.
The equivalence between the two types of mechanisms rests on a familiar
idea from choice theory.
Let X be a finite set and B ⊆ 2X . A choice function is a function
C : B → X such that C(A) ∈ A for all A ∈ B. We can associate a binary
relation ≻C with C, where x ≻C y if and only if there is a set A ∈ B with
x, y ∈ A and x = C(A). Note that ≻C is the revealed-preference relation.
The choice function C satisfies the congruence axiom if ≻C is acyclic;
that is, if whenever x1, . . . xK is a sequence in X such that
x1 ≻
C x2 ≻
C . . . ≻C xK ,
then it is false that xK ≻
C x1.
In our setup, each worker w and firm f is characterized by a choice
function: τWw and τ
F
f , respectively. We say that the congruence axiom holds
when all agents’ choice functions satisfy the congruence axiom.
Proposition (Equivalence) Whenever stationarity and the congruence ax-
iom hold, equilibria outcomes in weakly undominated strategies of the
static Gale-Shapley mechanism coincide with equilibria outcomes in
weakly undominated strategies of the dynamic Gale-Shapley mechanism.
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Furthermore, there is a one-to-one mapping between weakly undomi-
nated equilibrium strategy profiles corresponding to the two mechanisms.
B Markets
The ordinal preference profiles for the main market variants we run are given
below. Exact payoff tables, deviations for markets, and details on the stable
matches for these markets are available on request from the authors.
43
Fruit preferences Color preferences
f1 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c1 : f1 ≻ f2 ≻ f3 ≻ f4 ≻ f5 ≻ f6 ≻ f7 ≻ f8
f2 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c2 : f1 ≻ f2 ≻ f3 ≻ f4 ≻ f5 ≻ f6 ≻ f7 ≻ f8
f3 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c3 : f1 ≻ f2 ≻ f3 ≻ f4 ≻ f5 ≻ f6 ≻ f7 ≻ f8
f4 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c4 : f1 ≻ f2 ≻ f3 ≻ f4 ≻ f5 ≻ f6 ≻ f7 ≻ f8
f5 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c5 : f1 ≻ f2 ≻ f3 ≻ f4 ≻ f5 ≻ f6 ≻ f7 ≻ f8
f6 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c6 : f1 ≻ f2 ≻ f3 ≻ f4 ≻ f5 ≻ f6 ≻ f7 ≻ f8
f7 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c7 : f1 ≻ f2 ≻ f3 ≻ f4 ≻ f5 ≻ f6 ≻ f7 ≻ f8
f8 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c8 : f1 ≻ f2 ≻ f3 ≻ f4 ≻ f5 ≻ f6 ≻ f7 ≻ f8
Market (I): Assortative
Fruit preferences Color preferences
f1 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c1 : f3 ≻ f8 ≻ f7 ≻ f4 ≻ f5 ≻ f6 ≻ f1 ≻ f2
f2 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c2 : f6 ≻ f4 ≻ f5 ≻ f3 ≻ f2 ≻ f7 ≻ f1 ≻ f8
f3 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c3 : f8 ≻ f5 ≻ f3 ≻ f6 ≻ f1 ≻ f7 ≻ f2 ≻ f4
f4 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c4 : f5 ≻ f3 ≻ f4 ≻ f1 ≻ f7 ≻ f8 ≻ f6 ≻ f2
f5 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c5 : f4 ≻ f1 ≻ f2 ≻ f6 ≻ f7 ≻ f3 ≻ f8 ≻ f5
f6 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c6 : f4 ≻ f7 ≻ f3 ≻ f8 ≻ f5 ≻ f2 ≻ f6 ≻ f1
f7 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c7 : f5 ≻ f1 ≻ f3 ≻ f7 ≻ f4 ≻ f8 ≻ f6 ≻ f2
f8 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c8 : f2 ≻ f1 ≻ f3 ≻ f7 ≻ f6 ≻ f5 ≻ f4 ≻ f8
Market (II): One Full Aligned
Fruit preferences Color preferences
f1 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c1 : f5 ≻ f1 ≻ f6 ≻ f2 ≻ f3 ≻ f7 ≻ f4 ≻ f8
f2 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c2 : f1 ≻ f4 ≻ f2 ≻ f3 ≻ f6 ≻ f8 ≻ f7 ≻ f5
f3 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c3 : f4 ≻ f1 ≻ f3 ≻ f2 ≻ f5 ≻ f6 ≻ f8 ≻ f7
f4 : c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 c4 : f3 ≻ f1 ≻ f4 ≻ f2 ≻ f5 ≻ f8 ≻ f7 ≻ f6
f5 : c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 c5 : f2 ≻ f1 ≻ f7 ≻ f5 ≻ f4 ≻ f8 ≻ f3 ≻ f6
f6 : c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 c6 : f7 ≻ f6 ≻ f5 ≻ f8 ≻ f2 ≻ f4 ≻ f1 ≻ f3
f7 : c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 c7 : f6 ≻ f8 ≻ f5 ≻ f7 ≻ f1 ≻ f4 ≻ f2 ≻ f3
f8 : c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 c8 : f8 ≻ f7 ≻ f6 ≻ f5 ≻ f3 ≻ f2 ≻ f4 ≻ f1
Market (III): Split Two Aligned
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Fruit preferences Color preferences
f1 : c1 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c2 ≻ c5 ≻ c4 ≻ c3 ≻ c6 c1 : f2 ≻ f6 ≻ f3 ≻ f4 ≻ f5 ≻ f7 ≻ f8 ≻ f1
f2 : c2 ≻ c8 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c1 ≻ c6 ≻ c5 ≻ c7 c2 : f8 ≻ f4 ≻ f6 ≻ f3 ≻ f5 ≻ f7 ≻ f1 ≻ f2
f3 : c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c1 ≻ c5 ≻ c8 ≻ c2 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 c3 : f8 ≻ f5 ≻ f1 ≻ f6 ≻ f2 ≻ f4 ≻ f7 ≻ f3
f4 : c4 ≻ c1 ≻ c5 ≻ c8 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c7 ≻ c6 c4 : f2 ≻ f1 ≻ f6 ≻ f3 ≻ f7 ≻ f8 ≻ f5 ≻ f4
f5 : c5 ≻ c2 ≻ c1 ≻ c7 ≻ c3 ≻ c8 ≻ c4 ≻ c6 c5 : f1 ≻ f3 ≻ f6 ≻ f7 ≻ f4 ≻ f2 ≻ f8 ≻ f5
f6 : c6 ≻ c5 ≻ c8 ≻ c2 ≻ c4 ≻ c7 ≻ c3 ≻ c1 c6 : f3 ≻ f1 ≻ f5 ≻ f7 ≻ f4 ≻ f8 ≻ f2 ≻ f6
f7 : c7 ≻ c6 ≻ c2 ≻ c5 ≻ c3 ≻ c1 ≻ c4 ≻ c8 c7 : f1 ≻ f4 ≻ f3 ≻ f8 ≻ f5 ≻ f2 ≻ f6 ≻ f7
f8 : c8 ≻ c3 ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c4 c8 : f2 ≻ f6 ≻ f3 ≻ f1 ≻ f7 ≻ f5 ≻ f4 ≻ f8
Market (IV): Two matches, one very unstable
Fruit preferences Color preferences
f1 : c6 ≻ c1 ≻ c8 ≻ c4 ≻ c3 ≻ c2 ≻ c5 ≻ c7 c1 : f3 ≻ f6 ≻ f1 ≻ f7 ≻ f5 ≻ f8 ≻ f2 ≻ f4
f2 : c3 ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c6 c2 : f3 ≻ f8 ≻ f1 ≻ f7 ≻ f2 ≻ f4 ≻ f6 ≻ f5
f3 : c3 ≻ c6 ≻ c8 ≻ c2 ≻ c1 ≻ c7 ≻ c5 ≻ c4 c3 : f1 ≻ f8 ≻ f3 ≻ f4 ≻ f2 ≻ f6 ≻ f5 ≻ f7
f4 : c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c7 ≻ c5 ≻ c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c6 ≻ c8 c4 : f2 ≻ f1 ≻ f4 ≻ f5 ≻ f7 ≻ f3 ≻ f8 ≻ f6
f5 : c6 ≻ c1 ≻ c5 ≻ c3 ≻ c2 ≻ c4 ≻ c8 ≻ c7 c5 : f2 ≻ f8 ≻ f3 ≻ f5 ≻ f1 ≻ f4 ≻ f6 ≻ f7
f6 : c6 ≻ c2 ≻ c4 ≻ c5 ≻ c1 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c3 c6 : f2 ≻ f8 ≻ f7 ≻ f5 ≻ f4 ≻ f6 ≻ f3 ≻ f1
f7 : c8 ≻ c7 ≻ c1 ≻ c6 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c5 ≻ c4 c7 : f1 ≻ f2 ≻ f8 ≻ f6 ≻ f5 ≻ f4 ≻ f3 ≻ f7
f8 : c8 ≻ c1 ≻ c4 ≻ c3 ≻ c2 ≻ c7 ≻ c5 ≻ c6 c8 : f1 ≻ f5 ≻ f8 ≻ f4 ≻ f3 ≻ f7 ≻ f6 ≻ f2
Market (V): Two matches, unaligned preferences
Fruit preferences Color preferences
f1 : c2 ≻ c4 ≻ c1 ≻ c3 ≻ c8 ≻ c7 ≻ c6 ≻ c5 c1 : f1 ≻ f2 ≻ f3 ≻ f4 ≻ f5 ≻ f6 ≻ f8 ≻ f7
f2 : c2 ≻ c1 ≻ c4 ≻ c3 ≻ c7 ≻ c6 ≻ c5 ≻ c8 c2 : f3 ≻ f1 ≻ f2 ≻ f4 ≻ f8 ≻ f5 ≻ f7 ≻ f6
f3 : c4 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c1 ≻ c6 ≻ c5 ≻ c8 ≻ c7 c3 : f3 ≻ f4 ≻ f1 ≻ f2 ≻ f6 ≻ f7 ≻ f5 ≻ f8
f4 : c1 ≻ c3 ≻ c4 ≻ c2 ≻ c5 ≻ c8 ≻ c7 ≻ c6 c4 : f2 ≻ f3 ≻ f4 ≻ f1 ≻ f7 ≻ f8 ≻ f6 ≻ f5
f5 : c6 ≻ c8 ≻ c5 ≻ c7 ≻ c4 ≻ c3 ≻ c2 ≻ c1 c5 : f5 ≻ f6 ≻ f7 ≻ f8 ≻ f1 ≻ f2 ≻ f4 ≻ f3
f6 : c6 ≻ c5 ≻ c8 ≻ c7 ≻ c3 ≻ c2 ≻ c1 ≻ c4 c6 : f7 ≻ f5 ≻ f6 ≻ f8 ≻ f4 ≻ f1 ≻ f3 ≻ f2
f7 : c8 ≻ c6 ≻ c7 ≻ c5 ≻ c2 ≻ c1 ≻ c4 ≻ c3 c7 : f7 ≻ f8 ≻ f5 ≻ f6 ≻ f2 ≻ f3 ≻ f1 ≻ f4
f8 : c5 ≻ c7 ≻ c8 ≻ c6 ≻ c1 ≻ c4 ≻ c3 ≻ c2 c8 : f6 ≻ f7 ≻ f8 ≻ f5 ≻ f3 ≻ f4 ≻ f2 ≻ f1
Market (VI): Four by Four market
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